Since the initiation of major development projects, riparians of the Euphrates-Tigris river system, namely Turkey, Syria and Iraq, have begun utilizing those water resources under conditions of complex interdependence. A number of crises have occurred in the basin due to the lack of regularized consultation mechanisms among the riparians.
Introduction
The Euphrates and Tigris river systems are often considered as forming one basin because they merge in the Shatt-al-Arab waterway shortly before emptying into the Persian Gulf.
1 Both rivers rise in Turkey and flow through or along Syrian territory before entering Iraq. Turkey occupies the upstream position on both rivers. Almost all the waters of the Euphrates and a large portion of the waters of the Tigris originate within Turkey's borders. The average annual discharge of the Euphrates is 32 billion cubic meters (bcm) . Approximately 90 per cent of the water of the Euphrates is generated in Turkey, whereas the remaining 10 per cent originates in Syria. Iraq makes no contribution to the run-off. As for the Tigris and its tributaries, the average annual discharge is 50 bcm. Turkey contributes approximately 40 per cent of the total annual flow, whereas Iraq and Iran contribute 51 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively. No
Syrian water drains into the Tigris. The amount of water carried by the Euphrates-Tigris river system can be said to be reasonably sufficient for various uses by the three riparians. However, physical characteristics of the rivers coupled with the initiation of major development projects by the riparians has put exceeding pressures on the supply of the river system. Hence, excessive demand for more water exacerbates tension in the relations of the riparians with each other (Kibaroglu, 1998a) .
Emergence of the Water Dispute Among Turkey, Syria and Iraq
The relations of three riparians during the period between 1920 and 1960 can be characterized as harmonious. Although planning was done largely on a country by country basis, there were technical consultations among the three states through the early 1960s. None of the countries were engaged in major development projects that could have resulted in excessive consumptive utilization of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin waters. There was, therefore, no exigency during that period in devising a regime framework for better management and utilization of the waters in the basin. Even the inefficient and ineffective development and management practices of the three riparians did not have substantial negative impacts on the quantity and quality of the waters.
Populations were at manageable levels, and the rivers' flows depended only on natural monthly and yearly variations in discharge. The only serious concern of the two 3 3 downstream riparians was the devastating effect of intermittent flooding (Kibaroglu, 1998b) .
The water question emerged on the regional agenda when the three riparians initiated major development projects. It is only since the 1960s that Turkey and Syria have put forward ambitious plans to develop the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river system for energy and irrigation purposes. At the same time, Iraq also announced new schemes for an extension of its irrigated area. The uncoordinated nature of these supply-led developments as well as inefficient and ineffective demand management practices within the framework of national water policy and management of the co-riparians continue to be the principal causes of water imbalance in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin.
Specifically, the nature of water relations within the last 40 years has been closely shaped by the construction of major development projects, namely the Southeastern Anatolia Project (Turkish acronym GAP) of Turkey, and the Euphrates Valley Project of Syria. In the meantime a series of negotiations have taken place both before construction and after some of the facilities have been put into operation as the result of which several protocols have been signed.
Early Negotiations
The rise of the water dispute in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin goes back only about 30 years although the legislative history of the basin has a 65 year history (Belul, 1996) . However, the only substantial outcome of that meeting was the decision taken to exchange hydrometric information on daily water levels of the Keban and Tabqa reservoirs and weekly river flow measurements at gauging stations like Aboukemal and Hit. At a subsequent technical meeting a constructive decision was taken in terms of joint action. The three delegations agreed that some economic information regarding potential agricultural and power losses during the filling period of the reservoirs would be necessary to determine the filling program. Thereupon, the delegations agreed upon detailed directives for evaluating power and agricultural losses (Minutes, October 1973).
However, efforts to harmonize the results of these studies failed in a follow-up meeting at Thawra, Syria. Keban dams were completed a year apart . This was a period of continuous and particularly dry weather. The impounding of both reservoirs in the following two years escalated into a crisis in the Spring of 1975 (Kut, 1993) . Iraq accused Syria of reducing the river's flow to intolerable low levels, while Syria placed the blame on Turkey. The Iraqi government was not satisfied with the Syrian response, and mounting frustration resulted in mutual threats bringing the parties to the brink of armed hostility.
A war over water was averted when Saudi Arabia mediated that extra amounts of water be released from Syria to Iraq. Syria joined the JTC in 1983 whereupon Turkey, Syria, and Iraq held sixteen meetings up to 1993. The essential mandate given to the JTC was defined as to decide the methods and procedures which would lead to a definition of the reasonable and appropriate amount of water that each country would need from both rivers. The major items on the agenda of the JTC were the exchange of hydrological and meteorological 9 9 data and information on the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, the sharing of information on progress achieved in the construction of dams and irrigation schemes in three riparian countries, and the discussion of initial plans for filling the Karakaya and Atatürk
Reservoirs.
With regard to the exchange of data, Turkey as the headwater riparian, provided complete information including the rules of operation of the reservoirs in its territory in order to ensure better water management in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin. However, after sixteen meetings, the JTC could not fulfill its objectives and the talks became deadlocked, and failed to produce even outlines of its meetings. However, the role of the Joint Technical Committee should not be underestimated. Although its meetings were infrequent and appear to have made little substantive progress on the question of water allocation, it was a useful channel for communication. 9 The major issues that led to the deadlock were related to both the subject and the object of negotiations: whether the Euphrates and the Tigris be considered a single system or whether the discussions could be exclusively limited to the Euphrates. In other words, the final objective of the JTC was to formulate a proposal for the "sharing" of "international rivers," or to achieve a trilateral regime for determining the "utilization" of "transboundary watercourses." Iraq and Syria consider the Euphrates an international river that should be treated as an integrated system. Both countries insist on an immediate sharing agreement under which the waters of the Euphrates would be shared on the basis of each country stating its water needs. On the other hand, the Turkish position is that international rivers are only those that constitute a border between two or more riparians (Jouejati, 1996) . Turkey considers the Euphrates and Tigris as a single transboundary river system which crosses the common political border. Moreover, Turkey refuses to the downstream countries having the rights of co-sovereignty on the waters of the upstream country or vice-versa. With regard to the Turkish proposal of studying water transfer possibilities between two rivers, Iraq and Syria argued by giving priority to the Euphrates that the Euphrates and Tigris should be evaluated separately. This approach rejects the possibility of water transfers from the Tigris to the Euphrates in spite of very strong arguments in favor of such a move. However, the Turkish government has been eager to boost the agricultural potential in the region to expand its irrigated areas. Moreover, Turkey has asserted that the Euphrates-Tigris basin forms a single transboundary watercourse system which offers a unique opportunity to its downstream riparians, particularly Iraq. The Turks argue that all existing and future agricultural water uses need not necessarily be derived from the Euphrates, but may also be supplied from the Tigris.
Incidents of Water Crises in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
The Under the rubric of the main features of a water regime in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, the following paragraphs will present the suggested principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures which are thought to constitute substantial tools that the riparians can make use of as attractive institutional arrangements to foster the bargaining process and to persuade others to come on board as supporters of such arrangements.
Principles
Principles of an international regime reflect the aims and premises of a regime, and the goals members are expected to pursue. In other words, principles give the regime its identity and reason for existence. Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992). Hence, the combined framework of these successive conferences culminated in a set of general principles and norms that are acknowledged as guidelines for effective and equitable management and use of water resources (Kibaroglu, 1998b) .
The principle of "equitable management and utilization of transboundary rivers"
concentrates on factors which are more crucial and less arbitrary, such as the needs of the states, and is not simply a formula or a system for computing the most equitable allocation to which each watercourse state is entitled. This principle does not produce a clear and concise formula which, when all the data are inserted, produces a definitive division of the waters. The result of the application of this principle would not be an immediate comprehensive reallocation of all the waters in the watercourse. Rather, equitable utilization would enable and prescribe regional initiatives promoting efficiency, conservation, and economy of use.
To achieve effective water resources management, supply and demand management policies should go hand in hand. In that respect, Turkey has started to implement a hand, GAP presents a unique case requiring examination, since a transboundary river system, namely the Euphrates and the Tigris rivers, is the major source for irrigation in the GAP area. Hence, improvements in the patterns and levels of use and management of this river system will not only contribute to increasing water use efficiency at the national level, but will also support policies extending the existing capacity of transboundary water resources in order to meet the growing demands of co-riparians.
More importantly, experience gained in the GAP case in terms of attaining higher levels of productive efficiency through the adoption of advanced technologies and management options in the irrigation sector will also serve as a challenge to existing water use and management practices of its co-riparians Syria and Iraq.
The storage facilities which Turkey has built within the GAP region serve to regulate river flow which used to vary at extreme rates due to seasonal and annual variations in precipitation patterns (Kolars, 1991) . Furthermore, GAP not only offers benefits in terms of supply augmentation, but has also introduced for the first time in the region many innovative ways of demand management. That is to say, the Project has brought new technical, economic and managerial institutions to make better use of the limited water resources of the region in major water dependent sectors, namely agriculture. Syrian official arguments more or less overlap with the Iraqi ones. That is, Syria also claims that it possesses acquired rights dating from antique periods over the rivers that pass through Syrian territory. Iraq's, and to a lesser extent Syria's, claims to acquired rights would probably be ignored in line with the writing's of a well-respected scholar of international law that prior rights have no relevance to equitable water allocation (Lipper, 1967) . Hence J. Lipper argues that this doctrine should not be applied to international disputes because it is wasteful and unconducive to the optimum economic development of river basins. The historical or acquired rights doctrine claimed by Syria, and more often by Iraq, are inadequate in the sense that prior uses of water by downstream countries represent only one of many factors that have to be taken into account in reaching an equitable utilization of a transboundary river (McCaffrey, 1991) .
On the other hand, Turkey has been advocating the necessity of common criteria in allocating the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris basin, based on the principle of equitable utilization which is in turn grounded in the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty.
The needs-based approach of Turkey is simply a reflection of the limited sovereignty doctrine which combines the two contentious principles of international water law in an effective way: a) equitable right to use, and b) obligation not to cause significant harm (McCaffrey, 1991) . In order to operationalize this doctrine the needs of each riparian However, Syria and Iraq have insisted on increasing the minimum quota to 700-750 m3/s through ad hoc bilateral or trilateral sharing agreements. Both countries are concerned that they stand to lose the most (even receiving lower rates than 500 m3/s) if GAP is completed without having reached a water-sharing agreement. Hence, with a view to guarantee the bulk of the supply, Syria and Iraq have proposed sharing the waters of the rivers based on a simple arithmetic formula. This would mean that regardless of the discrepancies between the riparians' actual needs for water, the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin would be shared simply "equally", but not necessarily "equitably" or "effectively." Moreover, dividing the waters by volume, as suggested by Syria and Iraq, does not take the seasonality of the Euphrates into account whose flow varies considerably on a seasonal and annual basis. Such ad hoc arrangements would inevitably require frequent negotiation of new quotas to adjust the shares to the existing flow rates of the river system. This would frustrate the relations among the riparians further. As noted, a regime framework with its authoritative institutions would foster negotiations that would lead to basin-wide settlement.
Decision-Making Procedures
Decision-making structures of regimes function as platforms where participating states meet regularly. Hence, a certain level of institutionalization tends to occur, although to a minimal degree at the beginning. Concerning the Euphrates-Tigris river basin, the Joint
Technical Committee acted as a technical forum meeting regularly for general project discussions and the exchange of hydrological data. However, after 16 technical and two ministerial meetings, the JTC failed to fulfill its objectives and the JTC talks became deadlocked.
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Apparently, institutionalized cooperation through a technical body or a joint commission is more successful in preparing necessary data for decision-makers, collecting and standardizing information, investigating facts, and considering special circumstances than as a medium for long range decision making. Such activities are the prerequisites of a more equitable determination of shared water benefits. As the demanded water for a basin begins to reach the limits of supply, the flexibility of decision-making procedures to respond to water stress conditions becomes crucial. Such flexibility is most needed to provide new forums for dealing with water allocation problems which take place both in time and space.
Conclusion
The above listed institutions are designed to support and determine the agenda of negotiations for effective and equitable use and management of the waters of the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. However, these can only become operational if the three riparians agree to commence the negotiation process on the use and management of the rivers. The authors strongly believe that there is a need to resuscitate the long stalled and deadlocked negotiations among the riparians. To avoid the current stalemate where none of the parties can claim to be better-off, negotiations within the JTC could prepare a ground on which the riparians might coordinate their efforts. With a fresh impetus the goal of using the existing water resources effectively and equitably could be achieved. 
Notes
1 This is more a Turkish view than the "two basin" view often exposed by Arab states.
2
According to Article XII of this agreement on "Distribution and Removal of Waters" it was agreed that the waters of Kuveik shall be shared between the city of Aleppo and the district to the north remaining in Turkey, to satidfy the two parties. International Rivers for Other Purposes than Navigation, UN/Doc. ST/LEG/SER. B/12, 1963 8 This was the first of the GAP dams. 9 The final communiqués of the 16 Joint Technical Committee meetings were reviewed with the permission of the officials in the State Hydraulic Works (DSI) in order to come up with the above arguments.
10
A detailed discussion on the issues covered in the following sections can be found in Kibaroglu, Aysegul (1998b) . 
